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4. (Re)introducing Formalities in
Copyright as a Strategy for the Public
Domain
by Séverine Dusollier, Centre de Recherche Informatique et Droit, Université
Notre-Dame de la Paix (Namur)1
4.1 Introduction
Formalities are an oddity in copyright law, at least for the countries adhering to
the Berne Convention. Recently, however, many voices have been heard in favour
of the reintroduction of formalities in copyright law, in order to counteract the
rapid expansion of copyright protection and the ensuing diminishing of the pub-
lic domain.
The idea of reintroducing some formal requirements in the copyright regime,
so as to render access to copyright protection less automatic, has mostly appeared
on the agenda of the open content proponents. As described by Lessig, the Copy-
left initiatives aim, with a straightforward ‘Us Now – Them After’, to enable those
creators who wish (‘Us’) to give the public (‘Us’ again) free access to their works.
A further and necessary step to extend that regained freedom to the whole range
of copyrighted works would be to convince legislators to introduce some ele-
ments for enhancing the opening of content by granting copyright owners
(‘Them’) a limited monopoly on their works. Such a strategy, subsidiary and par-
allel to the deployment of Copyleft licenses, flows from the realization that the
open source and open content licenses will not be sufficient to open access to
and use of all creative content, if nothing is done to limit the extent of copyright
in creative content.
Introducing new formalities in copyright, or reintroducing old ones, is one of
the suggestions made by some scholars to reduce the power and extent of copy-
right. Formalities have been considered as a way to limit the automatic granting
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of copyright, to shorten its duration or to make its enforcement less easy. Ulti-
mately, such formalities would either aim at putting more works into the public
domain or at making protected works more easily available and usable.
Thus, such formalities are conceived as opt-in mechanisms, i.e. as gateways
through which the creator should pass in order to benefit from the protection of
copyright or from some of its added features. In the history of copyright, formal-
ities have always been considered, in the countries that provided them, as opt-in
systems. Copyright was granted upon the condition of complying with the form-
alities required by the law, whether registration, deposit of copies, copyright no-
tices and so on. A return to such systems of opt-in formalities would probably
have an effect on the public domain. It would burden access to copyright protec-
tion and, as a result, expand the public domain to all creative content for which
the creators have either decided not to apply for protection, or neglected to ac-
complish the required formalities.
However, formalities might have another effect on the public domain, if con-
ceived differently. Indeed, formalities could be imposed to secure the relinquish-
ment of one’s work into the public domain. Such system of reverse formalities
would remove the existing uncertainties, at least in Europe, about the possibility
to give up copyright in a work. It would also guarantee the public domain status
of a work for potential users. In this case, formalities would be an opt-out mecha-
nism.
This chapter will examine both types of formalities – those opting into the
copyright grant, and those opting out of the (now automatic) protection – and it
will assess their opportunity and validity. Part 2 will examine those formalities the
introduction of which (or reintroduction in some countries) has been proposed as
a precondition for benefiting from or for exercising copyright. In each case, the
validity of all these possible formalities will be assessed, specifically in relation to
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which prohibits making the existence or
exercise of copyright contingent upon formal requirements. More importantly,
the relevance of such proposals and their effect upon the promotion and availabil-
ity of the public domain or open content will be considered in order to underline
the pros and cons of the (re)introduction of formal requirements. Part 3 will con-
sider the introduction of formalities for opting out of copyright protection. Exam-
ples will be drawn from the open access movement and an assessment will be
made of the need for such formalities or, at least, for a better formalization of
public domain relinquishment. Part 4 will explore formalities that can exist out-
side of copyright legislation but that may have an effect on the public domain.
In conclusion, Part 5 will attempt an overall critique of the system of formal-
ities, which could enhance the public domain. I will argue for the retention of
some formalities and explain their potential for enhancing access to and dissemi-
nation of knowledge without impairing authors’ rights.
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4.2 Opt-In Formalities for Copyright
Opt-in formalities have played a part in the history of copyright, both in Europe
and in the United States. They have been gradually abandoned, particularly as a
result of the adhesion to the Berne Convention, Article 5(2) of which prohibits
conditioning the existence or exercise of copyright to the accomplishment of any
formal requirements. Would the reintroduction of some formalities in copyright
be appropriate and would it help the expansion or preservation of the public do-
main?
First, I will explain what type of open content could be enhanced by the intro-
duction of the formalities proposed and to what extent it can be equated with the
public domain in copyright. Then, I will review the history and early role of form-
alities in the copyright regimes. Finally, I will address the different formal condi-
tions necessary for the promotion of open content.
4.2.1 Formalities for Which Open Content?
The ultimate purpose of the proposed reintroduction of formalities in copyright is
to make more creative works available to the public – to make the public domain
grow. Traditionally, copyright scholars have opted for a strict definition of the
public domain, encompassing elements that are not protected by copyright, either
due to the absence of the conditions needed to acquire such protection (absence
of originality, mere ideas or principles); to a rule of exclusion (exclusion of offi-
cial documents, of the news of the day); or to the expiration of the term of the
right (works of an author deceased more than 70 years ago, works published
more than 95 years from publication or 120 years after creation for some works
in the US).
In recent articles, the notion of the public domain has been extended to em-
brace any freely available resources for intellectual production,2 because they are
not at all protected by copyright or because their use is beyond the copyright
monopoly. If the function of the public domain, as envisaged by Cohen3 –
whether cultural, creative, technical, scientific or purely cognitive or consumptive
– is to exempt authors from the exercise of an exclusive proprietary right, then it
should include not only those elements in which such rights are non-existent, but
also resources or practices that are left untouched by the exercise of those rights.
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From a practical point of view, the commons or the public domain should be the
field into which the public can enter without stepping on anyone else’s intellec-
tual rights. Economically speaking, it should cover the assets, or uses of such
assets, for which no transaction could take place, based on an exclusive right of
the author. Therefore, to determine the effect of possible formalities on the exten-
sion of the public domain, the latter can include all elements for which no exclu-
sive rights of copyright can prevent use. One can also refer to the definition of the
public domain devised by Chander & Sunder, that ‘the resources for which legal
rights to access and use for free (or for nominal sums) are held broadly’.4 This
definition rightly encapsulates the public dimension of the resources, the ‘com-
mons’ facet of the public domain, in other words the fact that the content en-
shrined by this notion of public domain is ‘open’, since it can be used by any
member of the public without infringing copyright.
Emphasizing the quality of the content that should be open, i.e. whose access
to use is not impeded by the existence or exercise of a copyright, is a reference to
the function and objective of the public domain. It forms a public domain com-
prising two main parts: the first is the public domain in a traditional sense – what
we can call the ‘structural’ public domain and encompassing elements that are
not protected by copyright; the second includes those resources protected by
copyright, but whose use or access is open and free (in the sense that no exclusive
right of the author can prohibit it) – what we can call the ‘functional’ public do-
main.5
This is the definition of the public domain/open content that will guide my
reflections on the introduction (or reintroduction) of formalities into the copy-
right regime. The role or objective of formal requirements can, indeed, be two-
fold. On the one hand – and it was this that was their original purpose in some
countries – they can determine the existence of private protection. In that case,
the default of compliance with those conditions would leave the creation in the
realm of the unprotected (structural) public domain, making the creation avail-
able for all to use. On the other hand, some formalities leave access to the copy-
right protection intact, but make it more difficult for owners to exercise or en-
force their rights. In that case, the content would still be protected by copyright
but, not having satisfied the formalities required, it could only be used by the
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public in certain circumstances. The content would then fall into the functional
public domain.
4.2.2 The Early Role of Formalities in Copyright
4.2.2.1 The history of formalities
Most early copyright laws required compliance with some formalities prior to the
granting of a copyright monopoly. The first copyright law in history, the UK’s
Statute of Anne of 1709, required the registration of the title of the work with the
Stationers’ Company and the deposit of copies in different libraries. Non-compli-
ance with those formalities was sanctioned by inability to enforce copyright be-
fore the courts. In order to comply with the revised version of the Berne Conven-
tion, this regime of formalities was suppressed altogether in 1911.
Similarly, the revolutionary decrees of 1791 and 1793, which gave birth to the
French copyright system, required that some copies of the work be deposited at
the Bibliothèque Nationale or, for visual works, at the Cabinet des Estampes. The
legislative decrees made this deposit the only prerequisite for the enforcement of
rights, although the case law has sometimes construed this formality as a condi-
tion for the birth of copyright.6 The formality of deposit was abolished in 1925, in
order to allow French law to conform to the Berne Convention. However, deposit
still plays an important role in France and it was recently expanded to websites,
software and databases. A failure to fulfil the deposit requirement does not affect
the existence or exercise of the copyright, but is a criminal offence. It should be
noted that many countries have such a deposit system but do not make it a pre-
requisite for the existence or exercise of copyright.
In the United States, the 1790 Federal Copyright Act required a whole range of
formalities.7 Works had to be deposited and registered with the Secretary of State,
and a notice of copyright registration had to be published in different newspapers
for at least four weeks. A copyright notice, providing the identity and location of
the author and the date of copyright, was also to be affixed on each copy of the
work. Copyright was granted for a limited number of years and could be renewed
once by complying with new formalities of registration by publishing proof of
compliance in newspapers.
In the first version of the Berne Convention, it was admitted that an author
seeking protection in a country other than the country of origin had to subject
her work to the conditions and formalities required by the law in the country of
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origin of the work. This first admission of a role for formalities in copyright pro-
tection was eventually abolished by the Berlin revision that occurred in 1908. The
rule now appearing in the Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is that ‘the enjoy-
ment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality’.8
Most countries have suppressed the formalities that they imposed on the exis-
tence or exercise of copyright, following the revision of the Berne Convention at
the beginning of the twentieth century. This was not the case, however, in the
United States, which did not become a member of the Berne Convention until
1989 and where many formalities have continued to exist until now. In order not
to fall foul of its international obligation, the US legislator has made the existing
formalities voluntary, while offering some inducements to compliance.9 Registra-
tion is still a predominant formality and acts as a prerequisite to an infringement
action. Statutory damages and attorney’s fees can only be claimed for infringe-
ment procedures related to registered works, whereas the affixing of a copyright
notice to the work disallows the defence of innocent infringement. The registra-
tion of transfers of copyright ownership is also encouraged by the law.
4.2.2.2 The objective and effect of the formalities
The decision to make the enjoyment of copyright dependent on formalities is
often considered to be part of the typical distinctions between copyright’s regimes
and the system of droit d'auteur.10 The history of literary and artistic property
shows, however, that formalities have existed in both systems. Nonetheless, one
can rightfully assume that the perspective of each national regime regarding
copyright strongly influences the existence and persistence of formalities. This is
underlined by Ginsburg, who sees copyright primarily as ‘a governmental incen-
tive-program’11 and suggests that ,where the law favours free copying, there may
be many formalities to comply with before copyright protection can be enjoyed.
The mere creation of the work is not sufficient to justify protection and an addi-
tional burden is put on the author to assert her rights. Thus, the public domain is
considered to be the default destination of literary and artistic content and copy-
right protection is seen as the exception, conditioned by compliance with the
formalities laid down by the law. Conversely, in regimes where copyright is con-
sidered as simply flowing from the creative act, ‘no further action should be nec-
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essary to confer the right’.12 Such a view became predominant in author-centred
systems of copyright, such as France.
This was also the rationale behind the prohibition of formalities introduced in
the Berne Convention in 1908, as a result of which the Contracting Parties opted
for a copyright system centred around the notion of authorship.13
More specifically, the early formalities pursued different objectives. One of the
first and foremost of these was to make the granting of copyright less easy in
order to preserve the public domain. This objective explains the presence of form-
alities in all early laws, whatever the country. The public domain objective is also
in line with the idea, prevalent in most countries at the time, that intellectual
property is a limited monopoly. Early copyright laws, influenced by the Enlight-
enment ideology (in which the emergence of literary and artistic property is
rooted), considered that ideas belonged to everyone and that only the author
should be granted a limited right, the purpose of which was to promote both the
act of creation and the public dissemination of works. In this way, copyright was
shaped as the granting of a limited entitlement, both in duration and scope, and
was either conditioned by a formalities-compliance process or accompanied by
formalities enhancing the public access to works.
Within this framework, the aim of submitting the grant of copyright to formal-
ities was to protect the public interest of access to creative content, both by en-
cumbering the process of protection for copyright owners and by creating, via the
formality of deposit, a huge repository of works available to the public. Formal-
ities played a double role: Firstly, establishing the compliance with formalities as
a default requirement meant that more creative works would fall into the public
domain. This would enrich the territory of open content, since it increased the
difficulty of putting a work within the ambit of property protection. Secondly,
when fulfilled, the formality of depositing copies of the work constructed the
kind of public domain that can be considered as belonging to the functional pub-
lic domain, as defined above. Works deposited in the relevant national libraries
were available for consultation and research, both during the duration of protec-
tion and after the expiration of the right. Thus, access to the knowledge or culture
they contained was enhanced.
Despite (or aside from) the granting of copyright protection, such a formality
gave birth to content that was relatively open. This is similar to the granting of a
patent, where the trade-off is between the granting of the monopoly and the pub-
lic availability of the knowledge contained in the invention to be patented. In a
way, such a deposit formality created a cognitive public domain encompassing
intellectual material, the content of which can be intellectually enjoyed or known.
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As far as copyright is concerned, where acts of viewing, reading, listening or en-
joying a work are not deemed to infringe copyright, the deposit of copyrighted
works adds a layer of practical accessibility to the enjoyment of protected content.
This enriches the cognitive public domain, in the same way as patent divulgation
does in the scientific field.
In other words, the role of the early formalities in copyright was a double-
edged strategy for promoting the public availability of works, at least in terms of
the deposit requirement, which had a significant archival function.14
Other, more practical, functions of formalities were designed to inform the
public about the existence of copyright protection in a work, about its rights own-
er and, in the case of the copyright notice, to indicate the date of publication.15
The case law also recognizes that the registration of a work, and more rarely the
presence of a copyright notice, could constitute prima facie evidence of copyright
protection.16
4.2.3 Old and New Formalities for Opening Content
4.2.3.1 Formalities conditioning the existence of copyright
The realm of copyright protection has increasingly been seen as excessive and the
ensuing shrinkage of the public domain has repeatedly been denounced. It seems
logical, therefore, that the initial ideas about the reintroduction of formalities
dealt with the conditions of enjoying copyright over creative content. Proposals to
subject the existence of copyright to some formal requirements have mainly been
voiced by American scholars. This is unsurprising given that the US has endured
a regime of formal granting of copyright for a long time.
Lessig was probably one of the first scholars to investigate the idea of formal-
ities as a way to constrain the copyright monopoly. In The Future of Ideas (2001), he
suggested a return to a formalities-driven copyright regime.17 The system he pro-
poses would be based on registration. Once registered, the work would be pro-
tected for an initial term of five years. Registration would be made simpler by the
technological possibilities offered by the internet and could occur via the website
of the Copyright Office. However, private and unpublished works would be ex-
empted from this registration condition and be protected, as they are now, simply
upon creation.
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Lessig detailed his proposal – again in favour of more formalities – once more,
in his 2004 book, Free Culture.18 Here he articulates a system the main objective of
which would be to create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formal-
ities. Registration of a work would still be the condition for enjoying the legal
protection of copyright.19 Nevertheless, instead of making the Copyright Office
the central point for registration, Lessig finds inspiration in the model of registra-
tion of internet domain names, which delegates the task of registering works to
competing registrars. (The Copyright Office would continue to establish and
monitor the central registry and would decide on a set of standards for registrars).
He expects that such a decentralized system of competing actors would signifi-
cantly lower the burden and cost of the registration formality.
This proposal is not without obstacles. First, there are doubts about the com-
patibility of the reintroduction of a registration formality with the Berne Conven-
tion. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is very clear in this regard: no formality
can condition the existence of the copyright. This prohibition undeniably com-
prises the obligation to register the work created as a precondition to enjoying
copyright protection. The only solution to making the registration proposal valid
would be to limit it to national works, as suggested by Sprigman.20 Indeed, the
Berne Convention only obliges Contracting States to refrain from imposing form-
alities conditioning the protection of a foreign work in their territory. Such an
obligation does not apply to works the country of origin of which and the country
in which the protection is claimed are the same.21 Such a limitation to national
works would, however, greatly impair the usefulness of the proposal.
Leaving aside the question of compatibility with international obligations, as
laid down in the Berne Convention, what could be the real effect of such new or
recycled formalities on the expansion of the public domain and, more generally,
on the copyright regime itself? The key motive for coupling the granting of copy-
right with a registration process is to grant copyright protection only to those
works that are worth it – i.e. that they have market potential. The copyright owner
would only endeavour to comply with and pay for the registration of these types
of work. As Lessig says, ‘if a copyright isn’t worth it to the author to renew for a
modest fee, then it isn’t worth it to society to support (…) the monopoly pro-
tected’.22
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This rationale begs some comments. First, it espouses a peculiar view of copy-
right where, in practice, protection would only be granted to those works that
might be expected to be commercially lucrative. The market demand (and success
or hope for success) would then shape the realm of copyright protection, albeit
indirectly. It seems to me that by making such a proposition, the (proclaimed)
foes of the increased commodification of copyright paradoxically avail themselves
of the category of the market to determine what should be protected by copyright.
Literary and artistic works do have value outside of that granted by the market. By
way of comparison, an invention’s value can be rightfully determined by the mar-
ket, since the system of rewarding inventors with a patent is based on the useful-
ness of the invention. Patents offer a monopoly affected by the industrial applica-
tion and social usefulness of each patent, whereas copyright is not.
Second, although the proposal for registration ultimately purports to put more
works into the commons, it curiously leads to the conclusion that only works that
are considered as valuable, from a market point of view, but also based on the
possible needs and demands of the public (how could the market potential be
evaluated otherwise?), will be protected. Works with no interest to the public – or
at least none recognized by the market – will fall into the public domain. Is this
really the kind of public domain that the proponents of an open content world
would like to build? It would mean a sort of openness by default, i.e. not only by
a default of compliance with formalities but, mainly, as a result of a lack of inter-
est or hope on the part of the author or rights owner in the commercial exploita-
tion of her work.
Finally, the proposal for the registration formality leaves many practical ques-
tions open. For instance, would there be a limited period of time in which the
registration would have to take place before copyright protection is forfeited? If
so, would this mean that a work that the author failed to register in due time,
would be forever placed into the commons or the public domain, even if this
work has commercial potential? Could the registration of a work be carried out
by an heir of the author after her death? Lessig’s proposal carries the implicit
assumption that the registration would only apply to published works, while the
current system of copyright could still protect unpublished creations. This awa-
kens doubts about the added value of such a proposal. It can reasonably be as-
sumed that publishers would always register their works in the hope or expecta-
tion of commercial success. Which works, then, would fall into the public
domain? Published works that the owner does not register because she believes
they are not worth it? Or published works that the owner has forgotten to regis-
ter? Works published by individuals on the internet, in blogs or discussion for-
ums? This is unlikely to constitute a rich domain of unprotected content.
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4.2.3.2 Formalities conditioning the duration of copyright
An important feature in the construction of a public domain of creative content is
the passing of time, since the monopoly conferred by copyright is temporary.
After a determined period of time has elapsed, the work is said to fall into the
public domain. The length of that period has varied in the history of intellectual
property but, on the whole, has tended to increase.
The reduction of the duration of copyright protection has often been posited by
opponents or critics of the scope of copyright.23 In fact, such arguments were
strengthened following a decision in 2003 by the US Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Eldred,24 which upheld the most recent US law extending the duration of copy-
right. This provoked a number of proposals calling for the duration of copyright
– considered to be excessive – to be reduced by reintroducing a formality of re-
newal after a short period of time.
In the aforementioned publications, Lessig suggested a return to the time when
copyright was granted for a limited period and could be renewed. In his view, a
first period of protection of five years should follow the first registration. This
should be renewable for up to fifteen times, upon renewed formalities of registra-
tion and payment of an gradually increasing fee.25 In the wake of the Eldred v.
Aschcroft decision, Lessig agreed with others that the term of protection could
even be made shorter than the potential duration of 100 years he first proposed,
but still be subject to a renewal procedure.26
Another idea connecting a shorter length of protection to a formal requirement
of renewal, was recently expressed by Landes & Posner.27 Based on an economic
analysis of the commercial exploitation of copyrighted works, they propose a sys-
tem of an indefinitely renewable copyright. The initial duration of the protection
would be very short, but it could be renewed an unlimited number of times. That
would not mean that the protection would be rendered perpetual, since Landes &
Posner anticipate that many copyrights would not be renewed, resulting in works
falling into the public domain perhaps even more rapidly than under the current
system. The result of such a system would be that the bigger the commercial
interest in a work, the longer the copyright duration should be. In turn, the costs
of renewal would be minimal compared to the expected benefits. Landes & Pos-
ner argue that it is not the duration of the right that matters, but the formalities to
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expand this duration and that reintroducing a renewal formality could ultimately
make the public domain grow.28
The criticism, expressed above, of the initial registration requirement can also
be made here. According to the rhetoric of both Lessig and Landes & Posner, the
public domain that would be gained through the reintroduction of a renewal
formality, would be reduced to the garbage of valueless (at least in economic
terms) works. This reasoning coincides with a commoditized view of the con-
struction of the public domain, in which the market value of a work (and not its
social one) dominates the protection. Under the system proposed, only valueless
works would fall into the public domain, whereas works with the most value
(where value is considered from an economic point of view) might be exclusively
owned for longer or, in the Landes & Posner scheme, even forever.29 Under such
a system, Mickey Mouse would be perpetually protected.
Perpetual protection for economically valuable works might even be worse than
the current system. Where economic value, rather than authorship, constitutes
the dividing line between protection and non-protection, the copyright regime
will only be shaped by the market’s demands. The public domain will be the
territory of market failures. This is a far cry from the vision of the public domain
as the necessary destination of all creative content through the ineluctable pas-
sing of time.
This peculiar vision also aligns itself with some of the justifications that have
been voiced in support of the extension of copyright duration. The enactment of
the US Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 was the result of the need to align
the US duration with that applied in the European Union and to take into account
demographic considerations. However, the need to extend the duration of copy-
right was also seen as a way ‘to keep pace with the substantially increased com-
mercial life of copyrighted works’.30 The commercial life of works would certainly
refer to the period of time during which they are valuable on the market. The
insistence on the economic life of works as a touchstone for deciding the ade-
quate duration of copyright is embedded in a strictly economic and commoditized
justification of copyright. It is not a cultural justification. I still doubt that by
referring only to economic motives, one can soundly develop and foster open
content and public access to creative content and scientific knowledge.
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Propositions to make the continued protection of copyright conditional have
also found their way into a US Bill, the Public Domain Enhancement Act, introduced
in May 2005 by Congressman Z. Lofgren.31 This Bill proposes that the Register of
Copyrights charges a fee of $1 for maintaining the copyright of any work pub-
lished in the United States. This fee shall be due 50 years after the date of first
publication or on a date to be determined after the enactment of the Act, which-
ever occurs later, and every 10 years thereafter until the end of the copyright term.
Such renewal formalities are contrary both to Article 5(2), which prohibits the
dependence of the enjoyment of copyright on any formality, and to Article 7,
which requires that the minimum duration of copyright be 50 years after the
death of the author, of the Berne Convention. The main effect of the proposals
seen so far would be to reduce the duration of copyright to less than the 50-years-
plus-life term. The only solution for keeping the renewal formality in line with the
Berne obligations would be to limit it to works of nationals, as in the Public Do-
main Enhancement Act. However, there is a possibility that this would make the
system even more complicated to administrate and even more complex for users
to grasp.
4.2.3.3 Formalities conditioning the exercise or enforcement of copyright
The exercise or enforcement of the rights granted by copyright can be subject to
different types of formalities, not all of which are contrary to the Berne Conven-
tion. However, any formal requirement that conditions the exercise of copyright
in such a way that impairs or constrains the enjoyment of the right’s exclusivity,
thereby rendering its existence meaningless, would certainly be invalid. Ginsburg
and Ricketson consider that such an invalid situation would be encountered
whenever any proceedings to enforce the right are made subject to a formality.
As examples, they cite the deposit of works in the revolutionary French copyright
decrees and the earlier US obligation of registration as a prerequisite to an infrin-
gement action.32 We will now examine the new formalities proposed by some
scholars in the context of the meaning of ‘the exercise of these rights’ under
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention.
A right to use the work in default of some formalities
Again, Lessig has suggested making the capacity of the copyright owner to com-
plain about unauthorized use of her work contingent upon the marking of that
work (that could be ensured with the help of the new technological possibili-
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ties).33 Should the work not be marked with a copyright notice, anyone would
have the right to use it, without this being considered as a copyright infringe-
ment. This would lead to the granting of a default license, which would be ap-
plied when the work is unmarked. Lessig does not seek to prevent the copyright
owner from complaining about such use, but the effect of such a complaint
would be, in his view, to prohibit any further uses of the work, leaving the exist-
ing uses untouched and lawful.
This idea has been elaborated by Sprigman, who attaches a similar conse-
quence to the failure of satisfying formalities.34 In his scheme, the registration of
the work and the affixing of a copyright notice would be voluntary. However,
non-compliance with these formal conditions would expose the work to a type of
legal or non-voluntary license, which would permit use of the work for a prede-
termined low fee (that would approximate the cost of complying with the formal-
ities). According to Sprigman:
That way a rightsholder who expects his work to produce revenue exceeding
the cost of complying with the relevant formality will prefer to comply with the
formality, whereas a righstholder who expects his work to produce revenue
amounting to less than the cost of compliance will prefer to expose his work
to the default license.
These two propositions differ slightly. Lessig’s idea is probably more inclined to
fall foul of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Indeed, non-compliance with the
formality of copyright notice would deprive the author of the very exclusivity of
her right, since she would be unable to stop previous exploitation of her work.
Sprigman’s proposition produces a more complex situation, where the default of
the formality does not prevent the copyright owner from exercising her right on
prior use. However, it does result in such use entering into the field of copyright
exceptions, in the form of a non-voluntary license. While such a proposal could
successfully pass the scrutiny of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, it would
also have to comply with the conditions of the ‘three-step’ test laid down in the
Article 9(2) of the Convention, which I will not discuss here.
I have more reservations about the efficiency of Lessig’s proposal than that of
Sprigman. In Lessig’s scheme, the author who forgets (or chooses not) to ensure
the marking of her work, only makes the uses of her work prior to the discovery
of her oversight or mistake fall into the realm of open content. One can imagine
that the rights owners who want to stick to a traditional proprietary exercise of
copyright would hasten to affix the copyright notice and to pursue those who
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infringe it. As a result, the content might be open for a very limited period of
time, which jeopardizes the efficiency and soundness of the whole construct.
It also raises the question of the status of copies already in circulation. A rights
owner who changes her mind (or realizes her forgetfulness) can only affix a copy-
right notice to copies of her works that she still has under her control – on those
copies not yet sold or produced. Does this mean that, despite the accomplishment
of the suggested formalities, the user who has access to an unmarked copy would
still be able to use the work without fear of a copyright infringement suit? Such a
conclusion would not give much weight to or incentive for the formality of mark-
ing once some time has lapsed. Rather, it would induce the rights owners to mark
their works immediately and before any distribution of copies, a measure which
would lead to less enrichment of the domain of open content.
I have similar reservations regarding all formalities that relate, in terms of their
practical application, to the material copies of a work. In particular, such formal-
ities give rise to a difficulty of evidence, given that the legitimacy of the usage of
the work by a particular user would now depend upon establishing the status
(marked or unmarked with a proper copyright notice) of the tangible copy of the
work she has accessed. In practice, this would introduce considerations about the
material copy, with which the user has accessed the work, into the debate about
copyright infringement. Yet, the determination of the dividing line between copy-
right infringement and lawful use should not refer to a criterion that is external to
copyright, i.e. the conditions under which a copy of the work was acquired. A key
principle in copyright protection is the autonomy of the intellectual property of
the work and of the real property of its material embodiment. Such a principle
seeks to avoid the confusion between the rule governing the possession of the
material copy and the conditions required to legitimately use (i.e. reproduce,
communicate to the public or any other use covered by an exclusive right of the
author) the copyrighted work itself. Attaching a formality to that material copy
would only increase the confusion between the work and its material embodi-
ment.
The same criticism can be addressed to the system of the default license put
forward by Sprigman, at least as far as the formality of the copyright notice is
concerned. However, his proposition to submit the unmarked and unregistered
works to a default license – for which the user has to pay a price – does not harm
the right of the copyright owner to the same extent. Besides, should the formality
be reduced to a registration, the default license system would not depend on the
status of the tangible copy, but rather, on the status of the intangible work itself.
Non-voluntary license schemes in file-sharing
A similar theme occurs in the discussion about peer-to-peer file-sharing. Propo-
sals to immunize the downloading, or even the uploading, of works by users of
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such networks have been numerous in recent years. Some suggestions have been
made to consider the downloading of works as falling under the ‘fair use’ policy
or the private copy exception, aided at times by lenient case law.35 Others would
prefer to submit such sharing of protected works to a non-voluntary license, the
costs of which would be covered in the price of the internet access connection.
Neither of these propositions really amounts to a formality imposed on the copy-
right owner. Opposing systems do touch upon the accomplishment of formal
requirements.
On one hand, the suggestion to subject peer-to-peer sharing to the mandatory
intervention of a collective society could be considered to be a kind of formality
that would ultimately make content more open. Such a proposition has even been
formulated in Europe by distinguished scholars whom no one can suspect of anti-
copyrightism. Specifically, von Lewinski has written in favour of a compulsory
collective management of copyright in the case of the distribution of works for
private purposes, within peer-to-peer networks.36
It is now commonly held that Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention does not
prohibit the obligation to entrust a collective rights management society with the
exercise of some rights in some peculiar exploitation contexts, as it does not limit,
in any way, the exclusivity attached to the right or the possibility of claiming en-
forcement.37
Should some states choose to adopt such a system of mandatory collective
management of copyright for the purpose of authorising peer-to-peer file-shar-
ing, such a ‘formality’ would make the creative content more open in that context,
by facilitating the transaction between the user and the rights owners. Nonethe-
less, the efficiency of such a system, compared to other cases of mandatory col-
lective management where the users are numerous individuals, has yet to be pro-
ven.
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Another proposition dealing with peer-to-peer file-sharing includes a formal
condition. Litman has suggested permitting rights holders to choose between al-
lowing their works to be shared in peer-to-peer networks in exchange for a levy
system and encapsulating their works in DRM systems of protection that would
prevent them from being further distributed without authorization.38 In other
words, the copyright owner would have the choice between a fully-fledged exer-
cise of her exclusive rights, aided by lock-up mechanisms, and an amputation of
her exclusive rights in favour of the users, compensated by an adequate remu-
neration. This system has been elaborated in another article by Peukert,39 who
dubbed Litman’s scheme a ‘bipolar copyright system’. Litman proposes that shar-
ing, compensated with a levy or tax, would be the default rule. Copyright owners
would formally indicate their will to opt out of that default license to maintain the
full exclusivity of their rights. This act of opting-out would involve providing the
work in a DRM format with adequate information for users or, alternatively, filing
a notice with the competent authority. Arguably, this can be considered a formal-
ity forbidden by Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention,40 since it imposes a formal
condition on the copyright owner in order to regain her exclusive rights. For this
reason, Peukert recommends transforming the model into an opt-in system, in
which the rights holder could positively choose to permit the sharing of her
works.41 Such an opt-in system would, in fact, consist of the very exercise of the
exclusivity afforded by copyright: by opting for a scheme of authorization of shar-
ing-plus-levy, the copyright owner exercises her right to authorize uses of her
work, normally covered by the monopoly. Thus, the formality-free Berne rule
would no longer be in the way. What differs from the actual situation, where the
rights owners can certainly decide not to sue users for file-sharing, is that a co-
herent mechanism of perception and repartition of levies would be provided to
the authors.
The effect of such a system on open content differs according to whether a
choice is made for an opt-out or an opt-in regime. Should the authorized file-
sharing of the work be the default rule, the formal and positive act to be complied
with by the rights holder to maintain her exclusive right would indeed promote
greater freedom to use copyrighted works in the digital environment and particu-
larly in peer-to-peer networks. Conversely, if the option for a compulsory licen-
sing scheme rests upon the rights owner, it is doubtful that the copyright industry
would prefer compensation through levies over a full remuneration enabled by
the exercise of copyright. However, some types of rights owners (individual
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authors, independent labels, performers, etc.) might well choose for a compre-
hensive, fair and effective mechanism of adequate remuneration. This would
compensate for the uncontrolled sharing of works and be an alternative to the
exclusive control of their works, since it might generate more secure compensa-
tion. Not all copyright owners value their copyright in the same way; not all of
them favour a model of complete control over the use of their works. The support
that the representatives of such rights owners have sometimes given to legal pro-
posals for a peer-to-peer compulsory license indicates that they may indeed wel-
come the opt-in system suggested by Peukert.
Formalities conditioning the enforcement of copyright
Other formalities can be imposed at the enforcement stage without being in con-
travention of the Berne Convention. The first type of valid enforcement formality
still operates in the US, where the claim for statutory damages and attorney fees is
contingent upon the prior registration of the work. Since they do not prevent the
enjoyment of the copyright or the initiation of an enforcement action, but only
confer additional remedies (that are not required by the Berne Convention), the
effect of such formalities is certainly an important incentive. That said, its effect
on open content is minimal.
Other formalities might be more relevant from a user’s viewpoint. For instance,
it would be very useful to oblige the rights owners to attach some publicity to the
transfer of their rights. The profusion of content available makes it very difficult
to know who the author of a work is and, more importantly, whom the user
should contact in order to obtain authorization to use a work. Copyright notices
usually served that purpose, at least by indicating who the initial rights holder was
and when the work was published. While the Berne Convention prohibits that
notice from being a condition to enjoy or enforce the right, it also encourages the
use of such mechanisms, by stating that such an indication would serve as a pre-
sumption of authorship.
One could take a step further and put in place a system of public registers, in
which the transfer of copyright from the original author to the subsequent and
successive rights owner(s) could be recorded. An incomplete registration of the
authorship status of a work would not lead to the forfeiture of copyright or of the
possibility to claim enforcement, but would mean that the unregistered transfer
to the user could not be opposed. Ginsburg and Ricketson approve such formal
rules that ‘tell us who is entitled to enforce a copyright whose existence the rules
do not call into question’.42 They also consider that ‘authors and right holders are
free, and indeed should be encouraged, to facilitate both would-be exploiters’
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clearance of rights, and general knowledge of when a work will fall into the pub-
lic domain’.43 Such a formality should be imposed by copyright laws.
4.2.3.4 Formalities conditioning new protections of copyright
Proposals for formalities conditioning additional protections of copyright, such
as protection against the circumvention of technological measures, are less rare.
Yet, they could prove to constitute an efficient way of making more content open.
Among the possible formal rules that could be imposed, are the traditional sets
of formalities, such as work registration or notice, which would not condition the
enjoyment of the right in the work, but only the possibility to benefit from the
legal protection of the technological measure encapsulating the work.44 The con-
sequence of not complying with those formal requirements would be that the
technological measure protecting the work could then be circumvented, without
fear of an infringement action (at least for the act of circumvention, the ensuing
copyright infringement would still be unlawful). However, the effect on availabil-
ity of creative content would remain minimal. The only additional burden would
be on the rights owners, albeit a burden that seems too minor to really matter in
relation to the burden of deploying technological protection around creative prod-
ucts.
Conveying a more significant purpose to the formality related to technical lock-
ups could have a more direct effect on the openness of the content. One idea
would be to force the copyright owner to publish information about the technolo-
gical measures used to protect the work or to entrust a public body with that
information. This publication could have two effects on enhancing open content:
First, it would enable competitors to develop interoperable products. The publica-
tion of the source code or the interface specification (or any other useful informa-
tion) of the means developed to protect and secure the content could be made a
prerequisite to the protection of such technical means. The lack of interoperabil-
ity between the systems developed to securely distribute works on the internet can
lead to a further content lock-up, whereby closed formats or standards of DRM
systems are used in an anti-competitive manner. Such anti-competitive behaviour
has already been observed in respect of certain legal platforms for music down-
loading, where an unattractive tied-in provision of content was offered without
being a necessity for copyright protection. The interoperability between different
DRM systems is encouraged by the European Commission in Directive 2001/29/
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EC of 22 May 2001 on Copyright in the Information Society.45 However, no incen-
tive or obligation appears in that text.
The French government has acted on this need for interoperability in its trans-
position of the Directive. The new provision appears in article L. 331-5 of the Code
de la propriété intellectuelle and relates to the definition of protected technological
measures. It also establishes a regulatory body (Autorité de Régulation), one of the
missions of which is to decide about the interoperability issues raised by the de-
ployment of DRM. This body can enjoin DRM providers or rights owners using
DRM to provide the information needed to achieve interoperability. That informa-
tion is defined as the technical documentation and interfaces needed to obtain, in
an open standard, a copy of a technically protected work and a copy of informa-
tion in an electronic form accompanying this work. The French transposition law
has not gone as far as conditioning the protection of the technological measure
against circumvention on the provision of the interoperability-related informa-
tion.
The second effect of the publication of useful information about the operation
of a technological measure could help the organizations in charge of reconciling
the presence of DRM with the benefit of some copyright exceptions to find ways
to effectively enjoy such exceptions. Already, some years ago, Cohen & Burk pro-
posed the use of a key-escrow system, which would enable users to benefit from
fair use, despite the presence of technological measures.46 A third party, trusted
by the public, would hold the keys to the technological tools used by the rights
owners and could ‘open’ or unlock the work when justified by fair use. Making
the protection of the technological measures dependent upon the deposit of the
keys would be a formality that might be effective in opening content to users in
legitimate cases. It could also help archive technically protected content and solve
issues raised by technological measures that become obsolete.
Would such formalities violate the prohibition of formalities imposed by the
Berne Convention? The WIPO Copyright Treaty states that Articles 2 to 6 of the
Berne Convention apply mutatis mutandis to the protection it provides.47 This in-
cludes Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention and seems to indicate that the exis-
tence and enjoyment of the adequate protection of technological measures shall
not be subject to any formalities. However, this proviso could be construed as
referring to the copyright protection it provides and not to the ancillary protection
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of the technological measures. It should not prevent requiring some formalities to
enjoy such a protection, and certainly not, setting up incentives, or even sanc-
tions, to promote the publication or public deposit of information, such as the
provision of the DRM-code or of any information related thereto.
One could go a step further and argue that formalities imposed as a prerequi-
site to the prohibition of DRM tampering belong to the overall balance pursued
by the anti-circumvention provisions, conveying the adequate protection required
by the WIPO Treaties. This adequate protection begs legislators to include the
proper safeguards for the exceptions, as well as access to knowledge and culture
as underlined by the Preamble of the 1996 Treaties, within the anti-circumvention
provisions.48
4.3 Opt-out Formalities
Formalities to opt-out of copyright protection would be another avenue to ex-
plore. As yet, they do not exist, but some formal systems are emerging, which
promote the use of some creative content, even when it is still protected by copy-
right. This section will give an overview of such systems and address new ideas
for formalizing the public domain.
4.3.1 Formal Systems for Orphan Works
Orphan works are copyrighted works for which a user cannot identify and/or lo-
cate the copyright owner, after diligent research. As a result of this impossibility
of identification of the copyright owner, no authorization to use the work can be
provided. This leads to an economic inefficiency both for the potential user, who
is forced to give up the envisaged exploitation of the work, and for the copyright
owner, who cannot benefit from revenues related to any exploitation.
Many countries have established mechanisms to solve the issue of orphan
works and to allow exploitation under certain conditions.49 I will not review all
the systems or solutions developed so far. What interests me most is the gradual
construction of a system partially based on formalities, in order to facilitate the
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availability of the orphan works. Orphan works are not part of the public domain
stricto sensu, but they contribute to what we have previously called the functional
public domain: provided a work is recognized as orphan, the works benefit from
a regime where access and reuse is generally granted, not on the basis of an
exclusive right but, depending on the country, within the framework of an excep-
tion, a compulsory license or an extended collective license arrangement (still
based on exclusivity, but in practice the exploitation will be authorized).
Different formalities can condition the orphan works regime. First, the Euro-
pean Recommendation of 24 August 2006, on the digitization and online accessi-
bility of cultural material and digital preservation,50 advocates the establishment
of lists of orphan works and works in the public domain in order to promote their
availability. This could amount to a registration or deposit mechanism for orphan
works, administered by collecting societies. In fact, collecting societies and li-
braries (through the European-based ARROW project) have already started to put
in place such lists or databases of orphan works.51 The Report of the European
High-Level Group on Digital Libraries also underlines the need to establish regis-
tries for orphan works, with the purpose of collecting information on any work
that has been declared orphan by the competent body or administration, in order
to facilitate searches by other users. In a sense, this establishes a formal registra-
tion of orphan works, which can lead to the specific regime for such works.
Another interaction between orphan works and formalities stems from the fact
that the issue has raised the question of the measures needed to improve the
availability of information on works, rights holders and rights. In particular, the
use of electronic and other identifiers, the creation, use and maintenance of me-
tadata in the digital files, the recognition of the value of standard identifiers, or
the naming of the relevant rights holders on the packaging or covers of works
have been mentioned. While these formalities are not mandatory, they may work
as incentives for the rights owners to affix proper information to the work, in the
form of a copyright notice or otherwise. This would prevent the application of the
regime of orphan works and is more lenient than the mere application of exclu-
sive rights. Thus, the development of a formalized system for identifying works,
rights owners and works that are considered orphan, would enhance the avail-
ability of works.
However, if the omission of registering the work or affixing a copyright notice
were sufficient to qualify the work as ‘orphan’, it would amount to a formality
prohibited by the Berne Convention, since the very exclusivity of the copyright
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would be reduced by not complying with these conditions.52 Therefore, the pre-
cise conditions for benefiting from an extended use of orphan works, should be
carefully determined to enable authors to properly exercise their rights.
4.3.2 Formalizing Open Access Mechanisms
Creative Commons or similar licenses rely heavily upon formal requirements to
promote openness and public availability of creative content. Indeed, the desire of
the copyright owner to share her work on a free basis requires her to undertake
some formal steps: Firstly, the identification of the basic rights granted to the
user (formalized by the choice of a different license for each combination of
rights) and secondly, the affixing of the chosen license to the work, embedded in
digital icons and a digital file accompanying the work.
This situation is a reversal of the traditional copyright formalities, where the
work has to be registered and a copyright notice has to be affixed to copies of the
work in order that they be granted protection. In Creative Commons licenses, the
choice for an open access regime depends on the registration of the work through
the Creative Commons licensing tool and, primarily, on the affixing of the rele-
vant icons and license, which formalize the open access regime chosen by the
creator. The Creative Commons system is probably a more elaborate example of
the formalization of the granting of open access, but other licensing systems
might work in a similar way.
Here, formalities play a new role in copyright law; not strictly opting-out of the
copyright regime, but opting-out of its exclusive nature and choosing a non-ex-
clusivity regime. Because it is a private-ordering mechanism, the creators adher-
ing to such models for the exploitation of their works are free to determine which
formalities to apply. One cannot talk prima facie of a requirement of formalities in
the open access field. However, the particularity of the Creative Commons licen-
sing tools is that they establish a genuinely normative system, with its roots in
private ordering, but which pretends to have value beyond the parties to the li-
cense, insofar as the license remains attached to the work itself.53 Consequently,
the formalization of the public domain feature (in the functional sense of the
public domain) of such licenses applies to the works themselves and they could
be considered as formalities enhancing the availability of works.
Some scholars have suggested going a step further by legally formalizing the
conditions to put copyrighted works under such a regime. Clément-Fontaine de-
fended a PhD in France that proposed a complete regime for open works.54 The
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recourse to the instrument of contract that characterizes the private ordering
strategy of the open access initiatives, suffers from an intrinsic weakness linked
to the privity condition of the contract and the legal uncertainty that results from
the often complex chain of successive open access licenses.55 This legal insecurity
may prejudice the user of the work.56 Clément-Fontaine offers a solution, propos-
ing the establishment of a specific status in the law for free works.57 Such a system
would necessarily imply some formality to publicize the exploitation of a work
under an open access regime. These formalities would serve as an opt-in to that
specific regime, or rather, an opt-out from the default copyright regime, which
requires an explicit and individual authorization to exploit the work. In addition,
it would make the author’s choice known to potential users. This proposal is not
so far removed from the primary role assumed historically by formalities in copy-
right.58
4.3.3 Formalizing Public Domain Relinquishment
In the same vein, formalities can be viewed as a means to allow for the definitive
abandonment of copyright in a work. Some authors would not be satisfied with
the open access strategy, but would like to give up their rights altogether and
relinquish their works to the public domain. This relinquishment faces legal is-
sues of validity, particularly in Europe where moral rights are generally said to
prevent a complete renunciation of copyright.
The legal aspects of a copyright abandonment certainly deserve greater atten-
tion in legal literature. In particular, the doctrine that equates copyright to a prop-
erty right should consider that property encompasses a right to dispose of one’s
goods: the owner of a tangible good can abandon it, thereby renouncing any right
over the object. This is the abusus in the civil law notion of property. If copyright is
nothing but a property right, then does the moral right offer sufficient grounds to
reject that right in order to dispose of one’s work?
The moral right itself may contain the features to justify the relinquishment of
the work into the public domain through the right of divulgation. The right of
divulgation, when recognized by copyright law, grants the author the right to
decide when and how her work can be disclosed to the public. This right of divul-
gation can certainly explain the author’s choice to exploit her work under a Crea-
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tive Commons or similar license. Would it not equally legitimize the divulgation
under a no-copyright regime? One might object on the basis of the inalienable
nature of the right of divulgation, which would support the argument that it is
impossible for the author to get rid of this right and therefore of the copyright
itself. Yet inalienability should not mean non-disposability.
In any case, the legal validity of the relinquishment by the author of her copy-
right merits further study. If recognized, it would be useful to formalize such an
abandonment by setting up formal steps to opt out of copyright protection, both
to protect the author from the consequences of a definitive, but ill-thought
through, decision and to publicize the work as belonging to the public domain.
4.3.4 Marking Public Domain Works
Recognizing the validity of copyright relinquishment begs another question, that
of the status of the voluntary public domain (or domaine public consenti). Admitting
that the author can renounce her copyright in favour of the public domain is only
a legitimate choice if no other person can regain copyright or exclusivity over the
work in any other way. This would demand that the works placed voluntarily in
the public domain benefit from a legal status that guarantees their non-exclusivity
and non-rivalry. Such a legal status should relate to any part of the public domain,
whether constituted of the free will of creators giving up their rights or of the
application of the law, as is the case for works excluded from the protected sub-
ject matter and for works where the copyright has lapsed.
Yet, no legal status exists for the public domain, which weakens its effective-
ness.59 At the time that intellectual property was created and during the constant
organization of its regime in the ensuing three centuries, no consideration was
given to the organization and institutional construction of the intellectual com-
mons or public domain. This was considered unnecessary because such com-
mons were a given; whereas intellectual property had to be built and designed to
organize exclusivity.
That situation has changed. The public domain is no longer a given, but an
exception to intellectual property. As a result of the public domain being seen as
the negative of property, as well as its default position of having no legal protec-
tion, it has never been submitted to a clearly defined regime and the non-exclu-
sivity of some goods has never been organized or governed. Conversely, this lack
of regulation has jeopardized the public domain, since it cannot rely on a proper
legal construction to preserve its key features of non-rivalry and non-exclusivity.
Thus, building a legal regime for the public domain should be a primary objective
for proponents of the public domain.60 There is no room in the context of this
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chapter to further develop this possible construction. That said, any legal status of
the public domain would greatly benefit from a formality regime, which would
primarily rely on the active deposit of public domain works and an assertion that
a work belongs to the public domain either through the will of its copyright own-
er or through the passing of time. Systems of marking public domain works
could also be developed.
Such formalities would not be contrary to Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention
as they would organize the non-copyright status of a work.
4.4 Formalities External to Copyright Legislation
Other formalities are worth mentioning, even though they are external to the
copyright regime and neither condition the enjoyment of the copyright nor the
enforcement of additional layers of protection currently organized by the copy-
right legal provisions.
The best known is the formality of the legal deposit of works, which has ex-
isted in many countries following the adoption of the prohibition on formalities
by the Berne Convention. In some countries, the sanctions for the failure to ac-
complish the deposit are rather harsh. In France, for example, a penalty of up to
€75,000 can be imposed. This is certainly an inducement for producers of crea-
tive content to comply with this administrative requirement.
The effect of these provisions on copyright protection and the public domain
are rather indirect. They would, at least, enrich a cognitive public domain, in the
sense that works would be stored in a public repository and their content made
available to the public. Additionally, as previously mentioned, if such a deposit
remained protected, it would greatly contribute to publicizing the public domain
works when copyright expires. The writings of Hess & Ostrom also suggest look-
ing at the protection of the intellectual commons in the institutional environment
that surrounds them.61 Economists have analyzed systems where commons are to
be found. Such systems are referred to as a common-pool resource. While some com-
mons are not owned by anyone (res nullius) or, conversely, they are collectively
owned (res communes) – in both cases ownership is not necessarily a legal term – a
common-pool resource will generally include some property rights, i.e. a set of
rights defining the access and use of the resource.62 Thus, common-pool re-
sources can be defined as ‘substractable resources managed under a property
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regime in which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from
the resource domain’.63
In the economic literature related to tangible resources, protecting the com-
mons from exhaustion and allowing a sustainable use of the resource can gener-
ally be done by protecting such common-pool resources. This can be done by
regulating access to these resources, by establishing a collective type of manage-
ment between possible appropriators of the commons or by coordinating their
activities.64 Ocean resources are protected by regulating access rights (including
fishing, commercial exploitation, mining, scientific research rights) to the pool or
domain that contains such commons.65 The same is true for Antarctica, where
rights of scientific research are shared and organized between countries, which
accept the rules and obligations of the applicable treaty.66
Hess and Ostrom have applied this traditional reasoning to creative content
and have tried to devise a scheme for enhancing the size of the intellectual com-
mons and access to them. Examples of common-pool resource systems in this
context are libraries or archives, repositories or even the internet.67 Making the
legal deposit of works mandatory could create and enrich a central repository/
library and establish a common-pool resource system that prevents the depletion
(in the sense of intellectual loss) of the intellectual goods created and produced.
This might be a sufficient objective in terms of the tangible commons where the
main concern is the risk of excessive consumption, exhaustion or pollution of
common resources (such as water, air, biodiversity, etc.). In terms of the intellec-
tual commons, however, overuse would not lead to exhaustion. Conversely, the
discourse about the intellectual commons should take into account their inherent
value; that is, the possibility of access to them and of obtaining knowledge of
their content. This explains Hess & Ostrom’s further step of analyzing the infor-
mation flows occurring in such systems and the way these flows could be better
organized, specifically through collective action, in order to ultimately enhance
access to the intellectual commons.68 Once the legal deposit is imposed, it be-
comes necessary to implement other policies in order to allow the public to have
knowledge of this intellectual wealth and to gain effective access to it, in respect
of copyright. The organization developed for managing access to such content
could eventually extend to the organization of an effective availability to public
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domain works.69 However, that reflection goes well beyond the issue of formal-
ities in copyright and could be the topic of further research.
Another obligation to foster access to some creative content could be applied to
scientific research. When research has been publicly funded, one could imagine
requiring the publication of the results in open access schemes.70 Here again, the
mandatory destination of specific scientific creation into the commons is the re-
sult of a material rule or obligation, rather than a formal requirement. It also
organizes a better system for information flows in a common-pool resource.
Even if, strictly speaking, it is outside of the copyright regime, such an obliga-
tion might be at odds with Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, to the extent that
it can be considered as preventing the rights holder from relying upon the exclu-
sivity of her rights when deciding the mode of exploitation of her work. To
achieve the same result, the funding authority could also decide to include a copy-
right waiver in the research contract. But this would deprive the author of her
exclusive rights altogether and would not necessarily lead to a better dissemina-
tion of knowledge. Acknowledging the legitimacy of the obligation to provide
scientific results in an open access scheme would be a lesser evil.
4.5 Conclusion: The Necessary Features of an Efficient Formalities
Regime
Reintroducing some formalities could be a way of fostering the dissemination of
knowledge and access to creative content. However, I doubt that the formalities
generally proposed by proponents of open content initiatives would be effective in
achieving this result. I have three criticisms with respect to the proposals emanat-
ing from the open content or commons movements.
First, most of the formalities proposed contradict the Berne rule that prohibits
formalities conditioning the existence or enjoyment of copyright. However, this
rule could be changed; it is not an immutable or sacred dogma, although lawyers
are inclined to think of it as part of the natural order and to believe in it reli-
giously. That said, the Berne Convention is not an easy piece of legislation to
modify and, personally, I believe it offers a reasonable and balanced framework
for the protection of literary and artistic property, particularly through its formal-
ity-free rule.
Secondly, I also have reservations about formal requirements that relate to the
material copy of a work, such as a marking requirement or the affixing of a copy-
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right notice. Not only does this raise practical difficulties for some types of works,
it also blurs the boundary between the work and its physical embodiment. By
contrast, the copyright regime (perhaps most clearly in respect to author’s rights)
is exclusively or, rather, primarily, concerned with regulating intellectual and in-
tangible works. More fundamentally, I find the very content of the formalities
proposed questionable. On the whole, their proponents consider that the burden
resulting from the obligation to comply with some formal requirements would be
sufficient to push more works into the public domain. I doubt this. My main con-
cern, however, is the logic of simply tying the formality to a supplementary bur-
den that the creators or producers of creative content will endeavour to adhere to
when they consider that their content is worth it. This puts the expected value of
the work at the centre of the efficiency of the formal requirements and makes this
value the main criterion for determining the line between what should and will be
protected by copyright and what might fall into the public domain.
In that sense, the reasoning applied to the desired construction of an open
content domain – in terms of commercial evaluation of the work or in terms of
the market – is rather ambiguous. It reinstates a relative inequality in the copy-
right regime between works that are worthy of protection and those that are not.
This is precisely the type of elitism and inequality in copyright that the Berne
Convention wanted to abolish when it prohibited the formalities, almost a century
ago. By rooting the granting of protection in the sole act of creation, the Berne
Convention made all creators equal under the copyright regime. Reintroducing
some formalities in copyright implies that all creators would have the same capa-
city to bear this burden. It also tends to neglect the possible impact of the eco-
nomic and social situation of the rights owner on the weight of that burden. This
corresponds to a particularly limited view of the creative process and would be a
peculiar way of building the commons.
One way that the burden could be lightened is by using technological tools.
However, if it becomes so easy, what would be the point of using formalities as a
filtering mechanism and as an indirect tool to increase open content?
I might be in favour of a reintroduction of formalities in copyright, but for a
completely different reason. Formalities could be imagined as an incentive linked
to the possible commercial success of the work, on the sole condition that copy-
right only protects cultural creation and that formalities be applied to other types
of intellectual creation for which the threshold of protection would be higher.71
This would demand making copyright a two-tier regime, where the protection of
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cultural works72 would be on the higher tier and formality-free, while other types
of creations, such as computer software, databases, informational works, and
neighbouring rights in phonograms, films and broadcasts, would only be pro-
tected when properly registered. The inherent value of this sort of creation, which
also justifies the demand for copyright protection, is not cultural but purely com-
mercial and could be perfectly assessed in terms of market value and access.
Therefore, applying a system of formalities to such creations, as a filter for pro-
tection, might be legitimate. However, this would require a complete shift in our
copyright world and it is a far more radical and heretical proposition than the one
developed by proponents of open content!
Without going to this extreme, some formalities could have a beneficial effect
on open content. One key condition could be that such formalities should not be
just burdens or formal procedures, but that they have a direct effect on the disse-
mination of knowledge and, in turn, on the revitalisation of a broader public do-
main. Imposing a public registration of any transfer of copyright would be an
important and Berne-compliant measure. Encouraging (or even imposing)73 the
publication of the way DRM and other technological measures operate could also
curtail the excessive monopoly now granted by technological measures and anti-
circumvention provisions. Submitting orphan works to a default license or the
judicial authorization of use would also solve a practical problem. It would act as
an incentive to properly and formally identify oneself as the rights owner and to
mark the work accordingly.
The legal deposit of all types of works should also be better organized and
made mandatory, even though its omission should not lead to the loss of copy-
right. The repositories of works constituted by such a deposit should then be
available to the public in an effective and copyright-compliant way. By the same
token, the old function of the formalities in copyright, i.e. that of allowing the
public conservation and consultation of works, would be restored without using
the formality as a burden on copyright owners that would ultimately discriminate
against some creators.
All examples of such formalities facilitate access to content that is generally
protected by copyright, without leading to the forfeiture of the literary and artistic
property right. The ensuing flow of content into the public domain is relative, as
it contributes to the making of a functional public domain (comprising copy-
righted elements, the access and use of which does not infringe copyright), rather
than a structural one (comprising elements not protected by copyright). It only
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facilitates a copyright transaction between the copyright owner and the user. It
might not be as ambitious as the often-heard propositions for more open content,
but it can, at least, answer some of the criticisms and questions raised by the
public wishing to use copyrighted works. It may also reconcile the prohibition of
formalities prior to the existence and enjoyment of copyright with the role that
some formalities could play in fostering access to knowledge.
More fundamentally, formalities to opt-out of the copyright regime should be
introduced, both to frame and better protect the wish of some creators to share
their works in an open access regime and to enable others to relinquish their
copyright. An overall regime for public domain works would be beneficial to the
copyright balance and should rely on deposit, registration, databases and mark-
ing mechanisms of public domain works. A clear status for the public domain is
still to be conceived and organized, but formalities would be needed to ensure its
effectiveness.
To sum up, I see a role for formalities in copyright in the sense that formalities
should help to effectively make creative content available. I do not believe that the
propositions for more formalities made by some open content advocates will ulti-
mately achieve a greater availability of copyrighted works. Returning to the old
formalities, even in a modernized form, would not suffice. However, imagining
new ones, primarily to organize the key (though often neglected) counterpart of
copyright that is the public domain, could be a more promising idea and one that
merits further exploration. This would lead to a more radical change of the copy-
right regime than the repetition of the old refrain of formalities.
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